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Abstract
In the light of recent writings of Richard Pring, and in relation to the application of empirical research  
methods in education, this paper offers a corrective to a neo-realist  viewpoint and develops a critical 
realist perspective. The argument is made that the deployment of empirical research methods needs to be
underpinned by a meta-theory embracing epistemological and ontological elements; that this meta-theory 
does not commit one to the view that absolute knowledge of the social world is possible; and that critical  
realism is the most appropriate meta-theory to underpin the use of empirical research methods. Further to 
this, unhelpful dualisms between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and between structure and 
agency, are discussed in relation to neo-realist and critical realist perspectives.
Animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs,  
(e) sirens, (f)  fabulous,  (g) stray dogs,  (h) included in the present classification,  (i) frenzied,  (j)  
unnumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the  
water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.—Jorge-Luis Borges (quoted in Foucault,  
1973, p. xv)
Introduction
Richard Pring in his article ‘The ‘‘False Dualism’’ of Educational Research’ (Pring, 2000a) and in his 
book The Philosophy of Educational Research (Pring, 2000b) espouses a form of neo-realism that allows 
for a reality independent of the viewpoint and stance taken up the observer, has an objective dimension to  
it, is not constructed in any meaningful sense by the observer, and supports a non-consensual and in part  
representational  view  of  truth.  From this  perspective,  he  offers  objections  to  two  familiar  research  
paradigms (naive realism and radical relativism7) and further objections to research methodology being 
dominated by the false dualism, as he understands it, between these two paradigms. He then develops an 
alternative  position  or  paradigm  that  allows  him  to  allocate  distinctive  roles  for  qualitative  and 
quantitative methodologies and these are not understood as in any way mutually opposed to each other.
Though Pring’s neo-realist position has been the subject of some debate (for example, Frowe, 2001), little 
has been written about the correctness or otherwise of the relationship that Pring and other neo-realists 
identify between this meta-theory and the use of empirical  research methods in education.  I  want  to  
suggest that critical realists, as well as sharing with neo-realists a belief in an independent reality, are 
better able to account for its socially constructed and non-solipsistic dimensions. My argument then is 
that any reconciliation between qualitative and quantitative methods and methodologies (Pring’s second 
objective) has to take account of the principles enshrined in a critical realist meta-theory.  Finally,  the 
central  ontological  issue of  the  relationship  between individual  self-determination  and social  context 
(agency and structure) will be addressed in critical realist terms, and the argument will be made that any 
reconciliations between naive realism and radical relativism, and between qualitative and quantitative  
methodologies, need to take account of this relation.
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Meta-Theory
Since  my  focus  is  on  the  relationship  between  a  critical  realist  meta-theory  and  empirical  research 
methods in education, in the first instance this comprises the acceptance of two propositions. The first is 
that the deployment  of empirical research methods requires, or indeed needs to be underpinned by,  a  
meta-theory, such as empiricism, critical realism or pragmatism. The second is that holding a belief that  
an independent reality exists does not commit the researcher to the view that absolute knowledge of the 
way it works is possible. Critical realists make the assumption that an ontological theory presupposes an 
epistemological theory; and further to this, that this meta-theory influences the way data are collected and 
analysed about the social world (the strategic and method levels).
The  first  of  these  propositions,  that  there  is  a  logical  relationship  between  ontology,  epistemology,  
strategy and method,  has been disputed by Bryman  amongst  others,  on the grounds that:  ‘it  fails  to 
recognize that a whole cluster of considerations are likely to impinge on decisions about methods of data 
collection’  (Bryman,  1988,  p.  125).  Although  there  are  always  likely  to  be  practical  and  ethical  
constraints on collecting and analysing data, it is not so easy to dispense with philosophical concerns,  
such as data authenticity or the truthfulness of statements that the researcher makes, and these cannot be  
subsumed into the practical activity of doing research. For example, a respondent in an interview may or  
may not give a truthful account of what they are doing; however, the researcher is still concerned with the 
veracity of  the  statements  made  to  them and subsequently with  the  veracity  of  statements  that  they 
themselves might make. To argue against the need to foreground philosophical concerns is to suggest that 
issues  of  validity,  reliability  and  truthfulness  should  not  be  central  to  the  work  of  the  researcher.  
Conflicting views of the social world, therefore, have no way of being resolved except through their 
respective practical  applications;  and even here philosophical  criteria would need to be developed to  
determine  which is  most  practically applicable.  Since the researcher,  by definition,  engages with the 
world  and  provides  a  description  of  it,  then  philosophical  issues,  even  if  they  are  not  explicitly 
acknowledged, underpin the methodological decisions that are made.
The second proposition is that  holding a belief  that  an independent  reality exists  does not  entail  the 
assumption that absolute knowledge of the way it works is possible; a position endorsed by most critical 
realists (for example, Bhaskar, 1979, 1989). There are a number of alternatives here. The first is that it is  
possible to determine fixed philosophical first principles that guarantee the certainty of knowledge that is  
produced; and, since that knowledge is about an extra-linguistic reality, then it is possible to identify with 
certainty an ontological framework that describes how the world works (i.e. naive realism). The second  
alternative is to argue that any attempt to determine the nature of the social world is always fallible; but 
this is not anti-realist in the sense that a world independent of particular human endeavours to describe it  
does exist (i.e. critical realism). A final position is to argue that, because there is this inevitable transitive  
dimension to epistemology, it is not sensible or even feasible to say that there is a real world that exists  
outside of and beyond the current ways that are chosen to describe it (i.e. radical relativism). Having 
established that the second of these alternatives is realist because it is accepted that there are objects in the  
world, including social objects, whether the observer or researcher can know them or not (cf. Bhaskar’s 
(1989) transcendental argument8 for an ontology of emergent properties located within an open system), 
it is also important to make sense of the critical dimension.
Critical realism is critical then, because any attempts at describing and explaining the world are bound to 
be fallible, and also because those ways of ordering the world, its categorisations and the relationships 
between them,  cannot  be  justified  in  any absolute  sense,  and  are  always  open to  critique  and their  
replacement by a different set of categories and relationships. Justin Cruickshank makes this point in the 
following way: ‘(c)ritical philosophy is therefore critical because it accepts neither the view that there are 
fixed  philosophical  first  principles  that  guarantee  epistemic  certainty,  nor  the  idea  that  first-order  
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activities  are  self-justifying’  (Cruickshank,  2002,  p.  54).  For  Cruikshank,  both the justification for  a 
critical realist position and its development depend on what he describes as an internal critique. Since 
there is this divide between reality and how it can be known, any picture theory to explain the relationship 
between  description  and  its  referents  is  likely  to  be  inadequate.  A picture  theory,  however,  can  be 
replaced with a model of internal critique, so that, within existing frames of reference, current or even  
past  ways  of  describing  the  world  are  shown  to  be  flawed  and  therefore  need  to  be  replaced  by 
alternatives. However, each alternative in turn is subjected to this internal critique, and cannot therefore 
provide epistemic certainty about the correctness of the ontological framework that is being proposed.
Critical realism then seeks to bridge the divide between the first and last of these positions. Furthermore, 
it seeks to reconcile the context-bound and emergent descriptions that are made about the world with the  
ontological  dimension  that  exists  outside  of,  and  is  independent  of,  attempts  to  describe  it.  Having 
suggested  that  the  epistemological  dimension  is  transitive,  it  is  also  important  to  acknowledge  the 
emergent dimension of the ontological framework. However, even if the researcher builds in an emergent 
dimension to their ontological framework, this cannot avoid the epistemological dilemma of whether they 
can in some absolute sense know it, since any ontological framework per se, even if it has an emergent 
dimension to it, is still subject to the idea that absolute knowledge of anything is not possible. This is also 
an acknowledgement of fallibility,  not in the naive sense that the observer could be wrong about the  
world because they adopted the wrong approach to its investigation, and thus if they adopted the correct 
method they could provide an accurate and truthful account of it, but in the sense that they are always one  
step  behind  the  evolving  and  emergent  nature  of  the  social  world,  and  the  looping  nature  of  the 
relationship between ideation and reality (Hacking, 1999) means that descriptions of the world, because 
they have the capacity to influence and change that world, may become redundant.
Error is a constant possibility in social and educational research, and this is illustrated by the frequent 
disagreements between researchers conducting parallel research studies. Error can occur for a number of 
reasons:  the  researcher  mistakes  appearances  for  reality;  the  researcher  uses  inappropriate  methods; 
correlations or associations are conflated with causal relations; resources at the disposal of the researcher  
do not allow her either to explore the subject matter of the research in any great depth or to triangulate  
using different methods that strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings; and respondents in  
interview studies and surveys may not give truthful answers. However, all these forms of error are at least  
in theory correctable. The identification of such errors, indeed the notion of error itself, implies that a  
better or more correct  way of proceeding is possible.  Fallibility,  on the other hand,  goes beyond the  
notion of error, and implies that social actors are positioned and, therefore, always observe the world from 
a  fixed  place  (geographical,  cultural  and,  more  importantly,  epistemological).  There  is  no  outsider 
perspective that allows the individual access to complete knowledge, including knowledge of how the 
world works. Frequently these two forms of fallibilism are conflated. However, no assertion is being 
made here that individuals can describe and thus change the world in any way they want (a solipsistic  
viewpoint), and this is because what is considered to be at that moment in time the most appropriate way 
of describing the world constitutes the reality that is external to individuals and to which they have to 
make reference. This implies that new ways  of describing the social  world are always  operating and 
replacing old ways, even if those new ways are in a critical relationship to the old. 
If this is accepted, then observers and researchers are not entitled to say that there are stable and enduring 
relationships in society that constitute reality, which is independent of them. They can only say that those 
relationships  are  constituted  as  stable  and  enduring  because  of  the  historical  play  of  signifiers  that 
constitutes their  understanding of  the  social  world,  which in  turn impacts  on historically located but 
evolving human practices; and this applies equally to the methods that they use to examine the nature of  
that social world. This position is neither solipsistic nor naively realist, but it does acknowledge the time-
bound  nature  of  their  deliberations  about  the  world.  What  it  also  implies  is  that,  as  researchers  or  
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observers,  they  cannot  avoid  entering  into  a  critical  relationship  with  previous  and current  ways  of 
describing the world and, since the way they create knowledge is a part of that social world, entering into 
a relationship with reality itself and possibly changing it (the internal critique). Therefore, essentialising 
explanations,  that  is,  the  production  of  generalisations  that  persist  across  time,  are  bound  to  be 
approximations  to  existing  conditions  that  currently  pertain.  Only  explanations  that  acknowledge 
emergence will suffice, and this also puts at risk the possibility of predictive knowledge (cf. Macintyre,  
1981,  and  his  four  logical  arguments  against  the  possibility  of  prediction9).  The  alternative  is  to 
acknowledge some universals of coherent thought (cf.  Strawson, 1959) that would set limits to those 
forms of life that individuals are embedded within and to the way those individuals can and do process 
reality. This solution however, cannot provide us with any certainty about what those universals might be, 
since it is the universals themselves that are implicated in the process of their own identification.
False Dualisms
Having set out the two main tenets of critical realism, I now want to explore the relationship between the 
meta-theory and the strategic and methodological decisions that researchers have to make. I want to do 
this  by  examining  Pring’s  (2000a)  neo-realist  position  that  attempts  to  reconcile  quantitative  and 
qualitative methods, whilst at the same time seeking to preserve the link between a particular meta-theory 
and the collection/analysis of data about the world.
Pring sets out to critique two well-known paradigms in educational research. The first of these (P a) is 
described by Pring as having the following characteristics: it is grounded in an assumption that there is an 
objective reality driven by immutable laws; the researcher is separate from the focus of their research;  
what follows from this is a notion of truth as correspondence between the research account and that which 
is independent of this account in reality; and problem and solution can be generalised from one setting to 
another. He contrasts this with a second paradigm (Pb) that has the following characteristics. Reality is 
concept-dependent, and, because people live through this world of ideas, is constructed; and there is no 
way that the person can step outside this world and thus there is no independent (that is, independent of  
the  person’s  viewpoint)  way  of  checking  that  those  ideas  faithfully  or  otherwise  represent  reality.  
Individual human beings communicate by negotiating amongst themselves, and through these processes  
of negotiation reach a consensus about how they should live; and this is an on-going process as new 
people with new ideas have to be incorporated into this consensus-building exercise. An idea of truth is  
possible,  and this  refers  not  to  a  correspondence between ideas  and reality  but  to  the  nature  of  the  
consensus; as a result of this, there is nothing objective in the world, where this refers to that which is 
independent of this world of ideas; and because we cannot talk about a reality that is independent of our 
conceiving of it, there are therefore, ‘as many realities as there are conceptions of it - multiple realities’ 
(Pring, 2000a, p. 253).
A number of arguments are put forward by Pring against radical relativist or constructivist ways of seeing 
the world (Pb). The first is that any thorough-going relativist approach cannot claim any special status as 
knowledge because relativists deny the possibility of knowledge being produced about the world that is 
not relative to historical and social arrangements. This is the familiar self-refuting argument. The second 
is to deny that reality exists outside of the individual’s conception of it is also to deny the existence of  
other people’s conceptions of it, and, therefore, of any possibility of verifying one set of precepts over 
and above any other. If disputes between people can only be resolved socially and politically, without 
invoking a truth criterion, then this leaves the most vulnerable even more at risk. 
The third argument Pring deploys to counter radical relativism is that because there is an infinite number 
of ways of classifying and dividing up the world (a position that he accepts), this doesn’t imply that the 
world is in fact divided up in an infinite number of ways.  I should add here that Pring is careful to  
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distance himself from Pa, though he comes close to asserting what he is refuting. Thus, Pring’s argument  
that there is in theory an infinite number of ways by which the world could be divided up is countered by 
the claim that the social world is not divided up in an infinite number of ways, and this therefore allows  
him to deny relativism,  assert  a limited form of objectivity and build in the possibility of a truthful  
account of that reality emerging. However, and contrary to this, a critical realist, though ready to accept  
that reality is not constructed in any immediate sense, would argue that it has a history, and it is because  
of  this  history  that  an  independent  world  can  be  identified.  Finally,  Pring  asserts  that  even  if  it  is 
acknowledged that the social world is constructed in some meaningful way, this doesn’t imply that all that 
is left is negotiated meanings, because, for him, negotiated meanings presuppose the existence of things: 
These things must have certain distinguishing features that make possible our different constructions of 
the world.  It  is  always  possible to  refuse a construction that  is  imposed upon one,  not  simply from 
bloody-mindedness, not simply from lack of interest, but also from the fact that such a construction is not  
possible - given that reality (physical and personal) is what it is (Pring, 2000a, p. 256).
However, and in opposition to this, a critical realist would argue that social realia, many of these central 
to educational research, are what they are because of many decisions made in the past and currently being  
made by human beings living together, and are constructed in this sense. Pring seems to be arguing  
against this critical realist position when he suggests that the social referent is extra-linguistic and has not  
been constructed (even in the past) in any sense. He is thus in danger of arguing that language mirrors 
reality (Frowe’s (2001) designative function), though he explicitly rejects this; or of leaving vague the 
actual form of realism that underpins his thinking.  What Pring is doing here is, implicitly and at times  
explicitly,  making a number of conceptual moves to free human beings from a reliance on these two 
paradigms. He is criticising the tenets of the two paradigms and in effect substituting a third paradigm,  
which  is  nevertheless  paradigmatic  because it  seeks  to  address  and provide answers  to  foundational 
philosophical questions and because it is incommensurable with other established paradigms. 
For Pring, both Pa and Pb are wrong because their constituent features do not adequately describe the 
nature  of  knowing  (epistemology)  and  the  nature  of  reality  (ontology).  Drawing  attention  to  the 
misconceived nature of each, however, implies that a third position is possible, one moreover that better  
accounts for the structures of the world and how they can be known. This can be referred to as P c, and it is 
possible to describe some of its features: sophisticated realism; epistemological objectivity; the necessity 
of a notion of truth; and the possibility of both identifying an ontological framework and the means for 
deciding between different and incommensurable versions of reality. It is therefore possible to develop an  
epistemological  theory,  and  this  is  implied  by  his  move  from philosophy to  methodology  when  he 
concludes that certain types of approaches used for researching the social world are feasible, legitimate  
and appropriate. Qualitative work, for example,  ‘sets limits and gives greater refinement to the more  
general verifiable and (where possible) quantifiable claims which research should constantly be seeking’ 
(Pring, 2000a, p. 259). He ends up, therefore, arguing that quantitative work can fulfil certain purposes, 
i.e. determining the generalisability of objects and examining ‘social structures which constrain’ (Pring,  
2000a, p. 258) agents’ activities; and that qualitative work can fulfil other or alternative purposes, i.e.  
determining agents’ unique intentions and beliefs or their ‘subjective meanings’10 (ibid.). This leaves 
unanswered the question as to what the relationship between the two purposes is, and unless this issue can 
be resolved, the researcher or observer is unable to make appropriate methodological decisions.
Though Pb is developed from a particular reading of constructivism, and though he acknowledges that 
there are other alternatives to radical relativism11, indeed, his own, he still compares one extreme version 
with another extreme version and is thus quite easily able to describe what emerges as a false dualism. In 
the end, he is forced into the development of another dualism, which is never fully resolved. Critical 
realists,  on  the  other  hand,  attempt  a  reconciliation  by developing  a  particular  understanding  of  the  
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agency/structure relation. It may be objected however, that the agency/structure relation is not central to  
any empirical examination of the social world. Two arguments can serve to counter this. The first is that 
all empirical research makes ontological assumptions, whether explicitly or not, and thus it is incumbent 
on the researcher to foreground such issues in order to choose the most appropriate methods for their  
enquiry. The second is that every social situation available to the researcher for examination embodies  
assumptions about the ability or otherwise of social agents to act in the world in the context of structural 
or situational factors or constraints (Cruikshank, 2002).
Agency/Structure Relations
For critical realists then, the central relation of social reality is between agency and structure. Margaret  
Archer has identified four versions. The first comprises a neglect and marginalisation of agency so that  
‘structure and agency are conflated because action is treated as fundamentally epiphenomenal’ (Archer,  
1990, p. 81). The second takes an opposite form so that structure is understood as nothing more than the 
creation of agency, and thus has no independent powers from those potentially exerted through agency.  
The third view,  developed by Anthony Giddens (1984)  as  a theory of  structuration,  ties agency and  
structure  closely  together  and  gives  explanatory  primacy  to  neither,  because  they  are  mutually 
constitutive. Archer’s fourth view, a morphogenetic/morphostatic position, conceived in opposition to the 
theory of structuration, argues that agency and structure have distinct properties and powers that cannot  
be subsumed into the other.  Social structures pre-exist agential operations, and in turn human beings 
reflexively monitor the social  world,  individually or collectively exerting an influence,  and changing  
relatively enduring but emergent structures.
If Archer’s first two types are rejected, then methodological approaches that prioritise either structural or 
agential perspectives to the exclusion of the other also have to be rejected, and the researcher needs to 
adopt strategies and methods that allow her to enquire into who is doing what, with whom and for which 
reasons, in order to arrive at adequate explanations of structural properties (Carter and New, 2004). In a  
similar fashion, it is not possible to understand agential decisions unless they are contextualised in terms 
of the constraining and empowering properties of structures. It is therefore not appropriate to argue that 
investigation of structures lies in the quantitative realm, and investigation of agential activities lies in the  
qualitative realm, but instead argue that appropriate methodologies need to be developed and used that 
allow  understanding  of  the  relations  between  the  two,  and  this  may  involve  the  rejection  of  some 
methodologies because they treat either agency or structure as epiphenomenal. 
By  way  of  illustration,  I  will  take  the  case  of  quantitative  modelling,  a  highly  influential  research  
methodology in the field of education, and show how the principles underpinning critical realism are 
distorted in both its conceptualisation and application. The argument that will be made is that quantitative 
modelling comprises the adoption of certain forms of essentialism that misrepresent the emergent nature  
of the world. Furthermore, the claim that some essentialist explanations may be misleading does not in 
itself deny that some objects have similar properties, because a further claim is made to the effect that all 
classes of objects are not alike in every respect, though they may be understood as such (Sayer, 1997).  
These objections to quantitative modelling can be summarised as: a tendency to essentialise and thus  
provide misleading  descriptions  of  structural  properties,  a  neglect  of  ontological  and epistemological 
emergence, and a conflation of intensionality and extensionality, a consequence of which is that social 
actors’ beliefs about themselves and an external reality are treated as epiphenomenal.
Essentialism
Deterministic  essentialism  may  take  one  of  two  forms:  genetic  predisposition  and  institutional  or 
structural predetermination. Furthermore, a belief in genetic or institutional determinism doesn’t imply 
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that human beings are in a position to predict what will  happen. This is because they may not be in 
possession of adequate knowledge of events and activities in the world. Both forms of determinism deny 
the possibility of individual self-determination; in the first  case human beings are seen as simply the 
carriers of genes, and in the second place as imprisoned within structures that deny the possibility of 
thinking or acting outside of these constraints.  However,  structuralist  versions of human life may be 
understood  as  retrospective  rather  than  prospective  and,  therefore,  as  non-predictive.  This  points  to 
structures that have determined specific individual behaviours in the past or in effect caused them to 
happen; that is, x has led in the past to y, and has the potentiality to do the same in the future, given the 
same set of conditions. However, structuralism is not entirely compelling. 
For example, critical realists (cf. Bhaskar, 1979; 1989) would posit the existence of objects in society,  
which have this potentiality;  that is, they have powers or attributes that may not be actualised but are  
potentially realisable. A distinction is, therefore, drawn between the object with its set of powers to act  
causally in the world and a set of conditions (configurations of other objects) in a particular relation to 
them.  The  object  does  not  act  in  a  deterministic  way.  Frequently  an  assumption  is  made  that  the  
observer’s correct or incorrect description doesn’t influence the structure of either the primary object or 
the secondary objects or of the relations between them; the particular configuration of objects that causes  
something to happen, including the creation of new objects or the transformation of old objects. This  
assumption ignores the ‘looping effect’ (Hacking, 1999) that is a characteristic of social life, and this may 
in turn lead to another form of essentialising. Deterministic versions of essentialism are commonplace in  
educational  research,  and by eliminating human agency from the equation they in effect  misdescribe 
social life.
A further type of essentialism is reductionist in orientation. Whereas deterministic explanations can be 
located  in  the  ontological  realm,  reductionist  explanations  are  located  in  the  epistemological  realm,  
though they may have ontological  consequences.  Andrew Sayer  provides  a  definition of reductionist 
essentialism:  ‘the  practice  of  explaining  the  behaviour  of  concrete  (that  is,  many-sided)  objects  by 
reducing  them wholly  to  (or  reading  them off  from)  just  one  of  their  abstract  (that  is,  one-sided) 
constituents’  (Sayer,  2000,  p.  89).  Quantitative  modellers,  for  example,  treat  race  and  ethnic 
characteristics as variables which determine the whole range of dispositions and practices of the person 
concerned. 
The issue is complicated by the looping nature of the relationship between description and object. Though 
a  reductionist  explanation may in itself  misrepresent  social  life,  it  may in time  come to represent  it  
adequately  because  the  categorisation  involved  has  real  effects,  and  individuals  then  understand 
themselves and behave in accord with the original reductionist explanation. It is important, however, not  
to assume that it will change reality. The relationship between the cultural and the structural is dependent  
on a range of factors,  such as  the  means of  dissemination of ideas in society,  and the privileged or 
otherwise status of these ideas. But reductionism comprises in its initial manifestation a misdescription of  
the social relation that it wishes to explain.
Essentialising fails to distinguish between those properties and attributes that are necessarily attached to 
individual categories of people and to institutions and those that are only contingently attached, with the 
one transferred to the other. Necessary attributes of any object are, however, in some sense the product of 
human invention. This is not to suggest that an individual can create necessity by herself, but it is to  
suggest that many decisions made by individuals and groups of individuals, stretching back in time and  
occurring  in  different  places,  have  led  to  the  attachment  of  different  attributes  to  specific  objects.  
Attribution  of  this  type  is,  therefore,  historically  specific,  could  have  been  different,  and  is  as  a 
consequence potentially amendable. Essentialising tendencies have the capacity to fix human life and 
resist change. They do not in any sense describe the real nature of human beings in any absolute way,  
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though they may contribute to their social sedimentation. Race has no ontological basis (Carter, 2000), 
and yet  racial classification produces social objects and has social effects.  Thus the constructs which 
particular societies attach to particular practices and behaviours may have real material and causal effects.  
Some theories of human behaviour, however, have as their foundation the belief that human nature can be 
understood in essentialist terms. Furthermore, some quantitative epistemologies have at their root these 
essentialising tendencies.
Emergence
A further objection to quantitative modelling, the neglect of ontological and epistemological emergence, 
refers to the distinction between closed and open systems (cf. Sayer, 1992, 2000). Closed systems operate  
in two ways. First, they operate in a consistent manner; that is, there must be no change in the object that 
is the repository of those causal powers between different cases, and this refers to all the possible cases,  
now and in the future. Second, the external conditions of the causal mechanism must remain constant to  
allow the closed system to operate. This implies that when both these conditions hold, a causal relation 
can be inferred from the production of regularities. Social relations, however, take place in open systems. 
Here, the two conditions that pertain to closed systems are violated. Objects do not operate in a consistent 
manner; they change their nature. Furthermore, the external conditions for the exercise of those causal 
mechanisms change also. Thus, again it is likely that over time and in different places, different and non-
equivalent manifestations of those causal powers at work are in operation. The natural sciences operate in 
general with closed systems, and indeed natural scientists may deliberately create conditions that mirror  
them, i.e. working in laboratory conditions, where they seek to control those external conditions that may 
contaminate the workings of the system. 
Educational researchers have in general a more difficult task: the objects with which they are dealing 
(individual behaviour, relations between individuals and structural properties of systems) are more likely 
to change across time and be different in different settings, and those external conditions, that allow those  
powers  and  capabilities  to  be  manifested,  do  not  remain  constant.  This  means  that  the  principle  of  
equivalence that is central to all forms of quantitative modelling is unsustainable. As Sayer (1992, p. 177) 
argues,  ‘assumptions of linearity,  additivity and of the possibility of discovering practically adequate  
instrumentalist laws of proportional variation all depend for their success on a particular material property 
of the objects to which they refer’. Quantitative modelling of educational objects that change across time  
is only possible if the type of change involved is either purely quantitative or ‘reducible to the movement  
of qualitatively unchanging entities’ (ibid.). If that change is irreducibly qualitative, then like is not being 
compared with like and certain forms of quantitative modelling are not appropriate. For most educational 
processes, the object itself and the conditions for its realisation are subject to qualitative change; and this  
involves identifying how those objects change.
The key problem then for educational theorists and philosophers is to address the fact that the social 
world exists separately from the individual and is real, but also to accept that the set of constructs and the 
relationships between them that are used to describe that world could be different than they are. There are,  
as Pring (2000a) argues, an infinite number of ways of describing the world. Further to this, the social  
reality that is being described is in part formed by the types of descriptions that members of a society  
choose to make about it (cf. Frowe, 2001, though Frowe in turn makes the mistake of equating objective  
information with information that is constructed independently of the researcher or observer, and then 
arguing  that  this  lends  itself  to  a  quantitative  methodology  -  this  is  an  argument  which  mistakes  a 
contingent relationship for a necessary one12). Constructs and categories are, therefore, implicated in the 
nature of that social world. Any descriptions made about the way social life is formed refer to a world that  
has been constructed in part by other descriptions that have been made of that social world in the past.  
Furthermore,  any statements  made,  including statements about  the relationship between ontology and 
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epistemology, fall into this category and are, therefore, to some extent relative to previous attempts to  
make sense of the world.
Intensionality
By expressing intensional dimensions as extensional properties, quantitative modellers may, in addition, 
neglect  the  intensional  dimension  of  social  life.  Natural  science  models,  such  as  behaviourism,  for 
example, attempt to eliminate any references to beliefs, purpose and meaning. Critical realists, however, 
foreground  social  actors’  descriptions  of  their  experiences,  projects  and  desires.  If  such  intensional  
activity is marginalised by quantitative researchers, then this acts to reify social relations. 
This, however, doesn’t imply that social actors can always provide complete and accurate accounts of  
their activities, plans, projects and histories. However, critical realists argue that such phenomena are 
central  to  any investigation they may undertake.  Quantitative  modellers  are  effectively engaged in a 
process of transforming intensional dimensions of social life into extensional properties.  Richard Wilson 
for example, argues that:
It  is crucially important to note explicitly that use of a mathematical model does not imply that  
descriptions are untainted by intension. Rather, when we develop and apply such a model we arrange 
to package intensional idioms in such a way that, for the purposes at hand, we can proceed with 
formal calculations (Wilson, 1990, pp. 398–9).
Because variables have to be able to be expressed quantitatively, they have to conform to the principle of  
equivalence. The intensional dimension is, therefore, reduced or packaged so that it can be expressed  
extensionally. The result is that social actors and the relations between them (the objects of study) are  
reduced to shadows of their real selves; and the resulting descriptions that are made rarely reflect the 
richness and depth of human interaction.
Concluding Remarks
Quantitative modelling then has its limitations. It has a tendency to reduce and therefore trivialise both  
what is complicated and what is perceived to be complicated by participants in a social setting. Thus the  
picture that is received is both incomplete and in some senses a distortion (lacking wholeness) of the ontic 
state(s). Furthermore, a distortion also occurs if it turns out that the object of investigation lacks scalable  
dimensions.  Quantitative  modelling  is  so  constituted  that  the  associations  which  it  readily generates 
cannot easily be mapped into causal narratives; though of course all too easily associations and causal  
relations  are  conflated.  [Empiricists  argue for  persistent  relations  as  against  embedded  or  generative 
causality.] Such modelling focuses on the empirical (consisting of experiences) and subsequently neglects  
the  actual  (events)  and  the  real  (mechanisms).  This  is  why  the  predictive  capacity  of  longitudinal  
quantitative research as a confirmatory mechanism seems to be so powerful. Accuracy of representation is 
operating at the level of experience, rather than at any deeper level. Lastly, an unjustified claim is made  
that  the use of quantitative methods  or even qualitative methods or a mixture  of the two provides a  
privileged bridging mechanism between representation  (epistemology)  and what  is  being  represented 
(ontology). What I would argue it does is structure representations of the world in a particular way (which 
in turn, of course, may influence the way the world is structured), and is thus always a function, at least in  
part, of political, social and ethical arrangements.
The objections made above to certain forms of quantitative modelling are not made from either a naively 
realist  or  radical  relativist  position  but  from a  critical  realist  perspective.  This  perspective  is  subtly 
different  from Pc,  which emerged from Pring’s  (2000a) critique of naive realist  and radical  relativist  
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positions. Both a critical realist position and Pring’s own perspective accept a number of foundational 
principles. These are: that philosophical concerns need to be addressed prior to making decisions about  
strategies and methods; that it is not possible to describe the world in an infinite number of ways because 
reality acts as a constraint as to how it can be described; that there are objects in the world that exist  
whether they are known by anyone or not; that there is a need to focus on social practices that are not  
predetermined by social structures since human beings are knowledgeable agents with powers to make a 
difference and thus have the capacity to monitor their actions and change the practical setting of action  
(cf. Giddens, 1984); and finally, that a notion of error is accepted in relation to the possibility of providing 
a correct view of reality. 
Critical realists part company with Pring, however, on a number of matters. They introduce notions of 
objectivity and truth via the idea of the internal critique, arguing that first-order activities can never be  
self-justifying, whereas Pring argues for a sophisticated picture theory to explain the relation between  
description  and  reality  -‘the  negotiation  of  meanings  presupposes  the  existence  of  things  (including 
‘‘person things’’)’ (Pring, 2000a, p. 255). Secondly,  Pring underplays epistemological and ontological 
emergence, whereas a critical realist understands these ideas as central to any form of meta-theoretical  
explanation of the social world. Thirdly, Pring is reluctant to accept notions of epistemological fallibility 
and transitivity. Finally, Pring creates a new dualism between structure and agency that is never fully 
resolved but that needs a resolution if the emergent nature of the social world is to be fully grasped. The  
use of quantitative methods may allow human beings to generalise and, therefore, provide descriptions of 
structures  in  social  life,  but  only  if  they  can  avoid  essentialism,  reconnect  agency  with  structure, 
incorporate a notion of ontological emergence and epistemological transitivity, and not lose explanatory 
power by conflating intensionality with extensionality.  If  they are not  able to do this,  then their  use 
provides incomplete and misleading accounts of social life, that, given the close dialectical relationship 
between description and practice, acts to reify practice and treat first-order activities concerning the way 
the world could and should be organised as self-justifying.
Central to Pring’s argument is the idea that the divide between qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
the study of the social world is misleading: the two ends of the spectrum do not represent antinomies, but  
can and should be functionally separate but paradigmatically unified. I have suggested in this article that  
Pring provides a solution to one duality but only at the expense of creating another, and thus a resolution 
to the structure-agency problematic is not forthcoming.
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